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In much recent work, invariance under intervention has become a hallmark of the 
correctness of a causal-law claim. Despite its importance this thesis generally is either 
simply assumed or is supported by very general arguments with heavy reliance on 
examples, and crucial notions involved are characterized only loosely. Yet for both 
philosophical analysis and practising science, it is important to get clear about whether 
invariance under intervention is or is not necessary or sufficient for which kinds of causal 
claims. Furthermore, we need to know what counts as an intervention and what 
invariance is. In this paper I offer explicit definitions of two different kinds for the 
notions intervention, invariance and causal correctness. Then, given some natural and 
relatively uncontroversial assumptions, I prove two distinct sets of theorems showing that 
invariance is indeed a mark of causality when the concepts are appropriately interpreted. 
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 1. Introduction  
 
1.1 The project  
 
Much recent work on causal inference takes invariance under intervention as a mark of 
correctness in a causal law-claim (Glymour, Scheines, Spirtes, and Kelly 1987; Hausman 
and Woodward 1999; Hoover forthcoming; Redhead 1987). Often this thesis is simply 
assumed; when it is argued for, generally the arguments are of a broad philosophical 
nature with heavy reliance on examples. Also, the notions involved are often 
characterized only loosely, or very specific formulations are assumed for the purposes of 
a particular investigation without attention to a more general definition, or different 
senses are mixed together as if it did not matter. But it does matter because a number of 
different senses appear in the literature for each of the concepts involved, and the thesis is 
false if the concepts are lined up in the wrong way. 
 
To get clear about whether invariance under intervention is or is not necessary or 
sufficient for a causal-law claim to be correct, and under what conditions, we need to 
know what counts as an intervention, what invariance is, and what it is for a causal-law 
claim to be correct. Next we should like some arguments that establish clear results one 
way or the other. In this paper I offer explicit definitions for two different versions of 
each of the three central notions: intervention, invariance and causal claim. All of these 
different senses are common in the literature. Then, given some natural and relatively 
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uncontroversial assumptions, I prove two distinct sets of theorems showing that 
invariance is a mark of causality when the concepts are appropriately interpreted. These, 
though, are just a sample of results that should be considered.  
 
The two different sets of theorems use different senses of each of the three concepts 
involved and hence make different claims. Both might loosely be rendered as the thesis 
that a certain kind of true relation will be invariant when interventions occur. In the 
second, however, what counts as “invariance” becomes so stretched that the term no 
longer seems a natural one, despite the fact that this is how it is sometimes discussed in 
the literature – especially by James Woodward, whose extensive study of invariance is 
chiefly responsible for isolating this particular characteristic and focussing our attention 
on it.  
 
Nor is  “intervention” a particularly good label either. The literature on causation and 
invariance is often connected with the move to place manipulation at the heart of our 
concept of causation (Price 1991; Hausman 1998; Woodward 1997; Hausman and 
Woodward 1999): roughly, part of what it means to be a cause is that manipulating a 
cause is a good way to produce changes in its effects. “Manipulation” here I take it 
suggests setting the target feature where we wish it to be, or at will or arbitrarily. Often 
when authors talk about intervention, it sounds as if they assume just this aspect of 
manipulation.  
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Neither set of theorems requires a notion so strong. All that is required is that nature 
allow specific kinds of variation in the features under study.1 We might argue that 
manipulability of the right sort will go a good way towards ensuring the requisite kind of 
variability. But mere variation of the right kind will be sufficient as well, so we need take 
care that formulations employing the terms “manipulation” and “intervention” not 
mislead us into demanding stronger tests for causality than are needed. 
 
In this paper I am concerned only with claims about deterministic systems where the 
underlying causal laws are given by linear equations linking the size of the effect with the 
sizes of the causes. Although this is extremely restrictive, it is not an unusual restriction 
in the literature, and it will be good to have some clean results for this well-known case. 
The next step is to do the same with different invariance and intervention concepts geared 
to more general kinds of causal systems and less restrictive kinds of causal-law claims. 
 
This project is important to practising science. When we know necessary or sufficient 
conditions for a causal-law claim to be correct, we can put them to use to devise real tests 
for scientific hypotheses. And here we cannot afford to be sloppy. Different kinds of 
intervention and invariance lead to different kinds of tests, and different kinds of causal 
claims license different things we can do. So getting the definitions and the results 
straight matters to what we can do in the world and how reliable our efforts will be.   
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1.2 The nature of deterministic causal systems 
I need in what follows to distinguish between causal laws and our representations of 
them; I shall use the term “causal system” for the former, “causal structure” for the latter. 
I take it that the notion of a “causal law” cannot be reduced to any non-modal notions. So 
I start from the assumption that there is a difference between functional relations that are 
just true and ones that are true in a special way; the latter are nature’s causal laws. I will 
also assume transitivity of causal laws. This implies that the causal systems under study 
include not only facts about what causal laws are true – e.g. “Q causes P” – but also about 
the possible ways by which one factor can cause another – e.g. “Q causes P via R and S 
but not via T”.  
 
I discuss only linear systems, and I shall represent nature’s causal equations like this: qe 
c= Σaejqj, with the effect on the left and causes on the right. As will be clear from axiom 
A1, this law implies that qe =  Σaejqj; but not the reverse. Following the distinction 
between systems and structures, I shall throughout use qi to stand for quantities in nature 
and xi for the variables used to represent them. Also with respect to notation, I shall use 
lower case letters for variables and quantities and upper case letters for their values. I 
assume the following about nature’s causal systems: 
A1: Functional dependence. Any causal equation presents a true functional relation. 
A2: Anti-symmetry and irreflexivity. If q causes r, r does not cause q. 
A3: Uniqueness of coefficients. No effect has more than one expansion in the same set of 
causes. 
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A4: Numerical transitivity. Causally correct equations remain causally correct if we 
substitute for any right-hand-side factor any function in its causes that is among nature's 
causal laws.  
A5: Consistency. Any two causally correct equations for the same effect can be brought 
into the same form by substituting for right-hand-side factors in them functions of the 
causes of those factors given in nature's causal laws.  
A6: Generalized Reichenbach principle. No quantities are functionally related unless the 
relation follows from nature’s causal laws.  
More formally: a linear deterministic system (LDS) is an ordered pair <Q, CL>, where 
the first member of the pair is an ordered set of quantities <q1,…,qm> and the second is a 
set of causal laws of the form qk c=∑j<kakjqj (akj a real number) that satisfies A1 through 
A6.2 
 
2. Causal Law Variation, Invariance and on Kind of Causal Claim 
 
2.1 The first definitions 
 
The kind of intervention we shall be concerned with in this section is the same as 
employed by Pearl (2000b) in his work on causal counterfactuals and by Glymour, 
Scheines, Spirtes, and Kelly (1987) in their manipulation theorem (once we transform 
their notion from graph representations to linear deterministic systems). It is also one of 
the kinds that Daniel Hausman and James Woodward (1999) discuss in their joint work 
on the Markov condition.  
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 As I indicated in Section 1.1, the results I aim to establish are not really results about 
intervention in the natural sense of that term, but rather results about variation. The first 
kind of intervention, which will be under discussion here in Sec. 2, is one in which causal 
laws vary; in the second kind, which I discuss in Sec. 3, it is the values of the causes 
picked out in a fixed causal system that vary. We may perhaps be more used to thinking 
of quantities as taking on different values than of laws as varying.3 But all we need here 
is that there are different causal systems that relate to each other in the specific way I 
shall describe. The point I am trying to make is that it is the occurrence of these systems 
that matters4 for testing the correctness of causal claims; it is not necessary that they 
come to occur through anything naturally labeled an intervention or a manipulation.5 I 
shall, therefore, talk not of intervention but rather, of variation. 
 
In the first kind of “variation”/“intervention”, which I call causal-law variation, a new 
causal system is considered, similar in many ways to the first. Let us call the new system 
a test system for results of quantity q relative to the original system. The test system 
differs from the original that we wish to test by exactly one addition and two kinds of 
deletions. For a target quantity q, add the law q = Q for some specific value, Q,  of q 
within its allowed range. Drop 1) all laws with q as effect and 2) all laws linking causes 
of q with effects, e, of q where the causal influence passes through q – that is, any 
equation for e that can be obtained by transitivity from an equation giving q’s effects on 
e. The first is easy to say formally: drop all laws of the form q c= f(...). The second is 
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more cumbersome: drop any equation A: e c= f(..., g(...), …) for which there are 
equations of the form B: e c= f(…, q, …) and C: q c= g(…).  
 
As with “intervention”, there are a number of different kinds of invariance suggested in 
the literature. The one relevant here seems genuinely a notion of invariance, so that is 
what I shall call it. An equation in a (linear deterministic) causal system <Q, CL> giving 
a true functional relation (but not necessarily one that replicates one of natures' causal 
laws) is invariant in q iff it continues to give a true functional relation for any value that q 
takes in any test situation for q relative to <Q, CL>.  
 
We also need to be explicit about what an equation of the form xe = ∑ aixi in a causal 
representation is supposed to be claiming. I propose the obvious answer: an equation of 
this form claims records one of nature’s causal laws. When id does so, I shall say that is 
causally correct.  
 
2.2 The first theorem 
 
Theorem 1.  A functionally true equation is causally correct iff it is invariant in all its 
independent variables, either singly or in any combination. 
 
Correctness Æ Invariance 
The result in this direction is trivial now that the background is in place. Consider an 
equation that is causally correct: 
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 E: xe c= f(x1,…,xn). 
 
Consider a test system for the effects of qi for any qi represented by an xi in the right-hand 
side of E. The intervention replaces the causal system of which this equation is a part by a 
new one. This equation would be dropped from the new system if it has qi as an effect – 
which it hasn’t. Otherwise it would be dropped only if it has as effect an effect of qi – 
which it has – and it results from substituting g(...) for qi into some equation for qe, where 
qi c= g(...). But in this case qi would no longer appear in the equation to be dropped. So xe 
c= f(x1, ..., xi, …, xn) will still obtain in the new system. Hence E is invariant under 
interventions on qi.  
Clearly the trick in establishing the necessity of invariance for correctness is in the 
characterization of interventions. So we shall need to be wary when we introduce a 
different concept of intervention, as in Sec. 3.  
 
Invariance Æ Correctness 
Consider an equation  
F: xe ∑
=
=
N
i 1
ii xa  
where either some xi appears that it is not the cause of xe, or, if all are genuine causes, 
some xi appears with a causally incorrect coefficient. In order to be invariant, F must also 
be derivable in all test systems for all qi and it must be derivable from the same equations 
as in the original. That is because the move to a test system adds only one kind of new 
law to use in a derivation – “qi = Qi” where Qi may be any value in the appropriate range. 
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This clearly will not help since Qi will vary from test system to test system, and F must be 
derivable in all of them. But if F is derivable from the same set of laws in the test 
situation as in the original, then not only will F be invariant in all xi, so too must each 
member of this set be. So we wish to establish:  
 
No matter what the causal system, no linear combination of nature's causal equations 
will yield an equation of form F that is invariant in all the qi represented on the right-
hand side of F. 
 
We should first notice that, trivially, 
 
Claim 1. No matter what the causal system, no causal equations used in the linear 
combination can have an xi on the left-hand side. 
 
The result is then established by coupling claim 1 with 
 
Claim 2. No matter what the causal system, no linear combination of causal equations in 
which xi’s appear only on the right-hand side will yield F. 
 
Proof of claim 2. The proof of Claim 2 is by induction on the number of variables in 
addition to xe and the xi’s that appear in the equations in the linear combination that 
yields F. 
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Inductive base. As a base for the induction, show that no linear combination of equations 
in any causal system that use no variables in addition to xe and the xi’s and are invariant 
in all xi will yield F. Here’s how: 
 
All equations used in such a linear combination will have xe on the left-hand side and 
some combination of xi’s on the right-hand side. That is, they will look like this: 
B: xe c= ∑ iixb  
C: xe c= ∑ iixc  
•  
•  
•  
where some of the bi and some of the ci will be zero. By consistency, some combination 
of factors from B cause factors in C or the reverse or both. But if factors in B cause a 
factor represented by6 xi in C, then B will not be invariant in xi. Similarly, if factors in C 
cause a factor, xi', in B, then C will not be invariant in xi'. So no two such equations can 
be used and F cannot be so obtained. 
 
Inductive argument. We aim to establish by reductio that if Claim 2 is true for a set of 
equations using n variables in addition to xe and the xi’s, it will be true for a set using n+l 
additional variables. So suppose F can be obtained using n+l additional variables; let 
z1,..., zk , k = N + n + 1, denote the variables that appear in a linear combination that 
yields F. 
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 Lemma. At least one of the ‘extra variables’ – one of the zi that is neither xe nor any of the 
xi’s – must appear as an effect in the equations used at least once. Call it z. 
This is true because 
i) Among extra variables that appear as causes, at least one will not be a cause of any of 
the other extra variables involved. Otherwise we would have a causal loop, which 
violates anti-symmetry. Call it z'. 
ii) Since z' does not appear in F, it must appear in at least two equations (one to introduce 
it, one to eliminate it). 
iii) Both these equations must have xe as effect since no xi can appear as an effect in an 
invariant equation. z' could appear with the same coefficient in both equations:  
 xe = az' + ∑ aizi 
 xe = az' + ∑ bjzj 
By consistency, ∑ aizi and ∑ bjzj can be brought into the same form by a set of laws, L, 
linking the zi and the zj. In this case these two equations containing z' can be replaced in 
F by the laws in L, which do not contain z', with no loss. Alternatively, z'  can appear 
with different coefficients in the two equations:  
 xe = az' + ∑ aizi 
 xe = bz' + ∑ bjzj 
But this is possible only if z' is a cause of either one or more of the zi or of the zj. 
Since these effects must be xi’s, the equation with the causes of these xi's will not be 
invariant in all xi. 
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We can now eliminate z in the following way: Consider nature’s causal law for z as effect 
that cites as causes just those factors that are direct causes of z among the zi. Designate it 
thus: 
 z c=   y∑ ii ya i ∈ {zi,…,zk} 
Replace any equation in the original linear combination in which z appears as cause by 
the same equation with ∑  substituted for z. Eliminate all equations with z as effect. 
Add nature’s causal equations giving the relations among all the causes that appear in all 
the different equations that had z as effect, as well as those connecting z’s parents with 
the effects of z among the z
ii ya
i. For example, supposing the relations in Figure 1, we replace 
 
z c= a1z1 + a2z2 + a3z3 
z c= a4z4 + a5z5  
z7 c= a6z6 + a7z  
with 
z1 c= b1z5  
z4 c= b2z2 + b3z3  
z7 c= a6z6 + a7(a1z1 + a4z4 ) 
 
Clearly the new set of equations will be invariant in all xi if the original are, and any 
equation in xe and the xi that can be obtained using the original equations can be obtained 
using the new ones. Q.E.D. 
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Figure  
 
 
3. Variation of Values, Prediction of First Differences and Parameter Correctness 
 
3.1 Systems that are nice for us 
 
The basic idea in connecting intervention/variation with invariance as a test of causality 
is Mill’s method of concomitant variation: as a cause changes, the effect should change 
“in train”. But there are caveats. The variation must occur in the right circumstances. The 
easiest circumstances are where the putative cause varies all on its own and no other 
causes vary at all. That is essentially what we achieve in the test systems of Sec. 2 by 
looking at variants of the original causal laws that make the putative cause take a 
particular value independent of what values other factors have.  
 
But sometimes, if a causal system is sufficiently nice, we can achieve essentially the 
same results by looking within the system itself. The simplest case is where each of the 
putative causes for a given effect has a cause of its own that can vary without any cross 
restraints on other possible causes of that effect. That will guarantee that all possible 
causes can take on any combination of values. I call such a system epistemically 
convenient.  
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More formally, an epistemically convenient linear deterministic system (ECLDS) is a 
linear deterministic system, <Q, CL>, such that  
 
A7: Epistemological convenience. For each qj in Q = {q1,..,qm} there is some cause qj* 
such that: 
i) qj c= Σk<jcjkqk + qj* 
ii) There are no cross-restraints on the values of the qj*; that is, for all situations in 
which <Q, CL> obtains, it is possible (“allowed by nature”) for each qj* to take 
any value in its allowed range consistent with all other qk* taking any values in 
their allowed ranges.7  
 
In case the LDS we are studying is an epistemically convenient one, we can relabel the 
quantities so that the system takes the familiar form 
q1 c= u1 
q2 c= a21q1 + u2 
•  
•  
•  
qn c= an1q1 + … + ann-1qn-1 + un, 
where n = m/2. For the remainder of this part, I consider only epistemically convenient 
linear deterministic systems, and I assume that the notation has its natural interpretation 
for such systems. 
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Notice that i) and ii) imply  
iii) no qk in Q causes qj*  
but neither 
iv) for all j, k, qj* does not cause qk* 
nor 
v) for all j, k, qj* and qk* have no common cause (i.e., they are not part of any 
other LDS in which they have a common cause). 
Many authors restrict their attention to systems satisfying iv) and v) as well, usually with 
the intention of mounting an argument from i), iii), iv) and v) to ii). I shall not do so 
because the argument is not straightforward and at any rate we need only the assumption 
ii) for deriving the results of interest here. 
 
Following standard usage, let us call the “special causes” represented by u’s in an 
ECLDS, exogenous quantities, since they are not caused by any quantities in the system. 
Notice that, for an ECLDS, an assignment of values to each of the exogenous quantities 
will fix the value of all other quantities in the system. In what follows it will help to have 
an expression for a quantity in the system in terms of the exogenous quantities. Again 
following conventional usage, I call this the reduced form.  
RF: q ...
11
1
∑∑∑ −
=
−
==
=
l
im
lm
k
il
kl
k
i
ik aauc
 
where we adopt the convention ∑ , if α>β.  
=
=
β
αj
i lkjf 1,...),,(
∑
=
Γ=∴
k
i
i
k
ik ucq
1
,  
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where Γ . ...
11 ∑∑ −
=
−
=
=
l
im
lm
k
il
kl
k
i aa
 
Call any set of values for each of the exogenous terms a situation. We shall be interested 
in differences so let us define ∆αjqn =df qn( u1 = U1, … , uj-1 =Uj-1, uj = Uj+α , uj+1 = 
Uj+1, … , um/2 = Um/2) - qn( u1 = U1, … , uj-1 =Uj-1, uj = Uj, uj+1 = Uj+1, … , um/2 = Um/2). 
 
Statisticians like epistemologically convenient systems because they make estimation of 
probabilities from data easier. We, by contrast, are concerned with how to infer causal 
claims given facts about association. For this project, these kinds of systems have three 
advantages. 
 
1) In Sec. 2 we discussed methods for finding out about a causal system of interest by 
looking at what happens in other related systems. But the existence of the system of 
interest provides no guarantee that these other systems exist for us to observe. In this part 
we shall be interested in situations in which specified factors take arbitrary values relative 
to each other. In an epistemologically convenient system this is guaranteed to happen 
“naturally” within the system itself – at least “in the long run”.8  
 
2) Consider a functionally correct hypothesis, 
 
H: xe c= Σaejxj 
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where each qj (represented by xj) has an exogenous cause peculiar to it satisfying ii). In 
this case nature provides a basic arrangement that allows the possibility for each qj to 
have an open back path; whether indeed each does have an open back path will depend 
entirely on our knowledge, but at least the facts are right to allow us knowledge of the 
right kind. Relative to qe, qj has an open back path just in case a) every causal law with qj 
as effect has a uj such that uj cannot cause qe except by causing qj, and b) we know what 
these u’s are and we know that a) is true of them.  
 
The nice thing about hypotheses like H where every putative cause has an open back path 
is that we can tell by inspection whether H is true or not. For no xj can appear in a 
functionally correct equation with a causally wrong coefficient unless some factor 
appears on the right-hand side of that equation along with a factor from its back path.9 
But according to a), no factor from the back path of qj can appear as a cause of qe in the 
same law as qj. The equation for xe is thus a true causal law, so long as nothing appears 
on the right-hand side that is from the back path of any other factor that appears there. 
Given b), we can tell this just by looking. According to Cartwright (l989), J. L. Mackie’s 
famous example of the London workers and the Manchester hooters works in just this 
way. 
 
3) Randomized treatment/control experiments are the gold standard for establishing 
causal laws in areas where we do not have sufficient knowledge to control confounding 
factors directly. These experiments require that there be some method for varying the 
causal factors under test without in any other way producing variation in the effect in 
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question. In an epistemologically convenient system, the exogenous quantities peculiar to 
each factor provide just such a method. 
 
3.2 The second definitions 
 
Now for “intervening”. The idea is to “vary” the value of the targeted quantity by 
adjusting its exogenous cause in just the right way keeping fixed the values of all the 
other exogenous causes. But as I indicated, neither the idea of our manipulating or of our 
varying anything matters. All we need is to consider what would happen were two 
different values of the exogenous cause of the targeted quantity to occur in two otherwise 
identical situations.  So I propose the following definition: A variation/intervention of 
values is a calculation of ∆jαqk for some j, k, α. Direct inspection of the reduced form for 
qk shows the following to hold: 
 
Lemma (on reduced forms and causality): If qj does not cause qk then ∆jαqk = 0. 
 
Along with the notion of “intervention”, we have to introduce new notions of invariance 
and causal correctness as well, otherwise the kinds of theorems we are interested in will 
not follow. The result in one direction still follows: any causally correct equation will be 
invariant under variation/intervention. But that is because any true equation will be, 
including all those equations that suggest joint effects of a common cause as causes of 
each other. Hence the result we really want in order to test for causal correctness will not 
follow, i.e., it is not true that any equation that is invariant under value 
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variation/intervention will be causally correct (even if we restrict attention, as below, to 
equations in which no right-hand-side quantity causes any other).  
  
What notion shall we substitute for that of invariance? The answer must clearly be tied to 
what kind of causal claim is made since we are not, after all, interested in invariance itself 
but pursue it as a test for causality. So far the kind of causal claim we have considered is 
terrifically restricted given our usual epistemic position. For we consider only hypotheses 
that claim to offer a complete (i.e. determining) set of causes and with exactly the 
weights nature assigns them. One way to be less demanding would be to ask for causes 
but not insist on weights.  
 
Another alternative is to insist that the weights be correct, but not insist on a complete set 
of causes. This is the one I consider here. If we are offering claims with some causes 
omitted, what form should the hypotheses take? One standard answer is that they take the 
form of regression equations: 
R: xk c= Σakjxj + Ψk, for Ψk ⊥ xj for all j, 
where x ⊥ y means that <xy> = <x><y>. This of course only makes sense if there is a 
probability measure from which the expectations are derived. So the use of hypotheses of 
this form involves an additional restriction on the kinds of systems under study, as 
follows. An Epistemically Convenient Linear Deterministic System with Probability 
Measure (ECLDSwPM) is an epistemically convenient linear deterministic system that 
satisfies A8. 
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A8: Existence of a probability measure. The quantities in Q can be represented by random 
variables x1,…,xm which have a probability measure defined over them. (Following 
conventional notation, we can relabel the x’s just as we have the q’s so that {x1,…,xm} = 
{x1,…, xm/2,u1,…, um/2}). 
 
What does an equation of form R assert? This kind of equation is often on offer but 
generally without any explanation about what claims it is supposed to make. I take it that 
it is supposed to include only genuine causes of xk and moreover to tell us the correct  
weights of these. I propose, therefore, to define correctness thus: an equation of the form 
R: xk c= ∑akjxj + Ψk (1 ≤ j ≤ m/2), for Ψk ⊥ xj, is correct iff there exist {bj} (possibly bj = 
0), {qj’} such that qk c= ∑akjqj + ∑bjqj’ + uk(1 ≤ j ≤ m/2), where qj does not cause qj’. This 
last restriction ensures that all omitted factors are causally antecedent to or 
“simultaneous” with those mentioned in the regression formula.  
 
It may be useful to consider an example:  
 q1 c= u1 
 q2 c= a21q1 + u2 
 q3 c= u3 
 q4 c= a41q1 + a42q2 + a43q3 + u4 
In this causal system the equation  
 x4 c= (a41 + a42a21) q1 + R  
is correct. It may seem worrying that q2 is omitted from the right-hand side of the 
regression equation and it is caused by q1, which is included. But this is alright. The 
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claims of the regression equation are correct under the proposed definition because there 
is a true causal law in which the coefficient of q1 is that given in the regression equation 
and no factors in the true law that do not appear in the regression equation are caused by 
ones that are mentioned.  
 
Now return to the unresolved issue of what can be introduced in place of invariance to 
dovetail with this characterization of correctness for regression equations. As I indicated 
in the Introduction, the notion that I use is not a notion of invariance at all. It is rather a 
notion of correct prediction: correct prediction of variation in values as situations vary in 
specific ways. This is not in any way a new notion, but it is one that Woodward has 
recently directed our attention to and that he has developed at length. I believe that what I 
define here is the right way to characterize his ideas when applied to epistemically 
convenient linear deterministic systems and I take it that the theorem I prove is one 
precise formulation of what he argues for (once a number of caveats are added to his 
claims). 
 
What do equations of form R predict about the difference in the size of effect between 
these two situations? If R’s claims are correct, the difference in the effect given a 
variation of the special exogenous variable that causes one of the right-hand-side 
variables, say xJ, should be thus: ∆αJqk = Σakj∆αJqj + Σbj∆αJqj’ for some {bj} and {q j'}, 
where no qj causes any q j'. By inspection of the reduced form equations in an 
ECLDSwPM, we see that the second term on the right-hand side is zero, since qJ does not 
cause any of the quantities that appear there. So R’s predictions are correct just in case 
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∆αJqk = Σakj∆αJqj. So let us define: an equation of form R correctly predicts first 
differences for all right-hand-side variables if and only if, ∆αJqk = Σakj∆αJqj for all α and 
for all J, where J ranges over the right-hand-side variables. 
 
3.3 The second theorems 
Now I can state the relevant theorem: 
 
Theorem 2a. A regression equation for qk, xk c= Σj=1k-1akjxj + Ψk, is causally correct iff for 
all α and for all J, 1 ≤ J ≤ k-1, ∆αJqk = Σakj∆αJ qj; i.e. iff the equation predicts rightly the 
first differences in qk generated from any value variation/intervention in any right-hand-
side variable.  
 
First a note on notation. In general there will be more q's in the underlying causal system 
than are represented by x's from the causal structure. For convenience I suppose that the 
q's are ordered following the x's: i.e., qj is the quantity represented by xj,. This means that 
we cannot presuppose that qi is causally prior to qi+1.  
 
Proof of theorem 2a. The proof from correctness to the prediction of first differences in 
qk under variations of right-hand-side variables is trival. To go the other direction, first 
reorder the q's so that they are numbered in their true causal order (so, qj can only cause 
qj+l for l ≥ 1), which we can do without commitment since the ordering is arbitrary to 
begin with. Then renumber the x's accordingly. For all 1 ≤ J ≤ k-1 and all α we suppose 
that  
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α q∆aq∆ ∑−
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=  
Note first that we can always write  
kj
m/2
1kj
kji
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kik uqBqAq ++= ∑∑
+=
−
=
 
where qj, k+1 ≤ j ≤ m/2, is not caused by qi, 1≤ i ≤ k-1, with Aki possibly 0. For consider 
any causal equation of this form where some of the qj are caused by some of the qi. To 
find a true causal law of the required form simply substitute for each of the unwanted qj 
an expansion in a set of causes of qj, all of which occur prior to all qi. From this it follows 
from our lemma that for all J such that i ≤ J ≤ k-1,  
iJ
α
1k
1i
kikJ
α q∆Aq∆ ∑−
=
= . 
We need to show that Aki = aki. Consider first ∆αL qk, where 1 ≤ L ≤ k-1 and qL is causally 
posterior to all other qi for 1 ≤ i ≤ k-1: 
LL
α
kLLL
α
LkL
α q∆A q∆aq∆ == , 
where the first equality comes from the assumption that the equation for qk predicts first 
differences correctly and the second from the true law for qk. It follows that akL = AkL. 
 
Next consider ∆αL’ qk, where i ≤ L' ≤ k-1 and qL’ is causally posterior to all other qi for l ≤ 
i ≤ k-1 except for L. 
L'L'
α
kL'LL'
α
kLL'L'
α
kL'LL'
α
kLkL'
α q∆Aq∆Aq∆aq∆aq∆ +=+=  
for the same reasons as before. Since akL = AkL, it follows that akL’ = AkL’. And so on for 
each coefficient in turn. Q.E.D. 
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 Notice, however, that this theorem is not very helpful because it will be hard to tell 
whether an equation has indeed predicted first differences rightly. That is because we will 
not know what ∆αJqj should be unless we know how variations in uJ affect qj and to know 
that we will have to know the causal relations between qJ and qj. So in order to judge 
whether each of the qj affects qk in the way hypothesized, we will have to know already 
how they affect each other. If we happen to know that none of them affect the others at 
all, we will be in a better situation, since the following can be trivially derived from 
theorem 2a: 
 
Theorem 2b. A regression equation xk c= Σj=1k-1akjxj + Ψk in which no right-hand side 
variable causes any other is causally correct iff for all α and J, ∆αJqk = akJ∆αJuJ.  
 
We can also do somewhat better if we have a complete set of hypotheses about the right-
hand-side variables. To explain this, let me define a complete causal structure that 
represents an ECLDSwPM , <Q = {q1,…, qm/2,u1,…,um/2}, CL> as a pair <X = {x1,…,xn: 
1 ≤ n ≤ m/2}, µ, CLH>, where µ is a probability measure over the x's and where the 
causal law hypotheses, CLH, have the following form: 
x1 c= Ψ1 
x2 c= a21x1 + Ψ2 
•  
•  
•  
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 xn c= Σj=1n-1anjxj + Ψn, 
where Ψj ⊥ xk, for all k < j. In general n < m/2. Since the ordering of the q’s has no 
significance, we will again suppose that they are ordered so that qj is represented by xj. 
Now I can formulate  
 
Theorem 2c. If for all xk in a complete causal structure, ∆αJqk = ∆αJxk as predicted by the 
causal structure for all α and J, 1 ≤ J ≤ n, then all the hypotheses of the structure are 
correct. 
 
For the proof we need some notation and a convention. What does the causal structure 
predict about differences in qk for ∆αkuk? I take it to predict that ∆αkqk = ∆αkuk=α. To 
denote a predicted difference I use ∆’, with ∆ reserved for real differences (i.e. those that 
follow from the causal system being modeled in the causal structure). So the antecedent 
of Theorem 2c thus requires that for all J, 1 ≤ J ≤ n,  ∆αJqk = ∆αJ’xk. 
 
Proof. Consider the kth equation in the structure    
k
1k
1i
ikik Ψxacx += ∑−
=
 
 
We need to show that  
k
m/2
1kj
jkj
1k
1i
ikik uqbqacq ++= ∑∑
+=
−
=
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where qi does not cause qj for 1 ≤ i ≤ k-1  and k+1 ≤ j ≤ m/2. We know that for some 
{Aki}, {Bki}  
 
k
m/2
1kj
jkj
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1i
ikik uqBqAcq ++= ∑∑
+=
−
=
 
where qi does not cause qj for 1 ≤ i ≤ k-1 and for j such that k+1 ≤ j ≤ m/2 and Bkj ≠ 0. So 
we need to establish that there is a set of Aki such that Aki = aki for all i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ k-
1. We do so by backwards induction: show first that the coefficient of xk-1 is correct and 
work backwards from there. Note for the proof that since qi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k-1, does not cause qj, 
for any j such that k-1 ≤ j ≤ m/2 and Bkj ≠ 0,  for l ≤ i ≤ k-1.  0qB∆
m/2
1kj
jkj
α
i =∑
+=
 
Inductive Base:  
To show , 1kk1kk aA −− =
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So .  1kk1kk aA −− =
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Inductive argument. Given Ak,p+s = ak,p+s for 1 ≤ s < k-1-p, to show Akp = akp, consider 
what happens given ∆αp. Using the reduced form for qi plus the assumption that all first 
difference predictions are right, and the fact that ∆’αpqi = 0 for i<p, we have 
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By hypotheses of the induction Aki = aki, for p+1 ≤ i ≤ k-1. Hence Akp = akp. 
 
There is one important point about exogenous variables that we need to be clear about to 
understand the significance of the theorems. By definition, ∆αJq is the difference in q 
given a difference in uJ with all other exogenous quantities in the system, not just those in 
the structure, held fixed. It is easy to see why. Consider a 6-quantity system  
q3 c= u3  
 q1 c= a13q3 + u1 
 q2 c= a23q3 + u2 
 
and a 2-variable causal structure to represent it  
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 x1 c= Ψ1 
 x2 c= c21 x1 + Ψ2. 
 
These will be true viewed just as regression equations given  
 
c21 = a23a13/[1 + a132] and Ψ2 = (a23/a13 - a23a13/[1+ a132])q1 + u2 – (a23/a13)u1.10 
 
If u1 varies while u2 and u3 do not, then we will see rightly that the equation for x2 is not 
correct. But if as u1 varies, u3 varies as well in such a way that a23∆u3 = c21∆u1, then the 
equation for x2 will produce the right first difference predictions for x2. That is why, to 
get a proper test for the equation, we must consider variation in exogenous variables in 
the structure while all other exogenous quantities in the system and (also in the structure) 
remain constant.  
 
This makes the results more difficult to put to use than we might have hoped. In the first 
place, for the theorems to apply at all, we need to know that we are dealing with an 
epistemically convenient system – one for which the exogenous factors have no cross 
restraints. But it is hard enough to know about the cross restraints on the exogenous 
causes for a set of putative causes we are considering in our structure, let alone for a lot 
of possible causes in the system that we have no idea of.  
 
Suppose though that we do have good reason to think that the system we are studying is 
epistemically convenient (or we are prepared to bet on it). How would we use the 
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theorems to which that entitles us? The most straightforward application of the theorems 
to test a hypothesis about the causes of q would consider variations in the exogenous 
factors for q’s putative causes holding fixed all other exogenous factors, where these have 
to include all other exogenous factors in the system. So we would have to know what 
these factors are. Again, it is hard enough to know what the exogenous causes are for 
factors we can identify without having to know what they are for factors we do not know 
about.11 
 
I take it that this is the chief motivation for stressing manipulation. It seems that if we 
vary the putative causes at will or arbitrarily the variation will not match any natural 
variation in other exogenous factors. But we know that is not true. Coincidences happen, 
even when the variation is chosen completely arbitrarily – which we know at any rate is 
hard to achieve due to placebo effects, experimenter bias and the like. For these 
theorems, exactly what is required is the right kind of variation, no more and no less. So 
the emphasis on manipulation for invariance tests of causality is misplaced, except as a 
not-100%-reliable methodological tool.12 
 
 
4. Final Remark 
 
We are interested in whether invariance (or some substitute) under intervention is a sure 
sign of correctness in a causal claim. I have formalized two distinct senses commonly in 
use for each of the three concepts involved. That means there are eight versions of the 
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question using just the concepts defined here. I have answered the question for only 
three: 1) for invariance under causal-law variation and correctness simpliciter, the answer 
(with caveats) is yes; 2) for invariance under intervention/variation of values and 
correctness simpliciter, the answer is no; and 3) for prediction of first differences under 
intervention/variation of values, the answer for prediction of first differences is yes.  
 
We can clearly carry on pursuing the other combinations, or devise modifications of the 
concepts that might serve better in hunting good tests. With respect to the concepts 
deployed here, one in particular is fairly central: that is the version of the question 
involving parameter correctness under first difference prediction. That’s because of our 
usual epistemic situation. First, when a hypothesis does not involve a full set of 
determining factors, we are forced to look at the predictions about first differences since 
it makes no sense to ask whether the hypothesis is invariant or not; and correlatively, we 
can demand only correctness in the parameters on offer, not full correctness. Second, 
when the system under study is not epistemologically convenient, we are forced to use 
causal-law intervention to get the variation we need. I take it the answer for this particular 
combination is yes – with caveats. But, as with any answer, we need a clear statement of 
the caveats and a convincing proof.    
 
There is a division among philosophers of science between those who believe that 
formalization is essential to understanding and those who do not. Here I have been 
arguing on the side of the formalizers. The point for me of studying the relations between 
causality and invariance is to make better causal judgments; and if different ways of 
 32
making our theses precise matter to how we make our judgements, then we had better be 
precise. We have seen that they do matter. Invariance under intervention is a fine test for 
causality if the intervention involves looking at what happens in different causal systems, 
but not if it involves looking at different situations governed by the same system of laws. 
Or, when we do look at different situations, what counts as a test of a causal hypothesis 
when none of the putative causes cause any of the others will not serve when some do 
cause others. 
 
Formalization is, however, nowhere near the end of the road. We still face the traditional 
problem of what all these precisely defined concepts mean in full empirical reality. In 
particular what is the difference between a variation in the value of a putative cause that 
arises from a variation in the causal system governing it versus one that arises from a 
variation in an exogenous cause that operates within the original system? Imagine I am 
about to do a randomized treatment-control experiment. How do I judge whether my 
proposed method of inducing the treatment fits one description or the other? I do not 
know how to answer the question. Perhaps indeed the distinction, which makes such clear 
sense conceptually, does not fit onto the empirical world it is intended to help us with. 
Formalization is, to my mind, the easy (though necessary) part of the job. Our next task is 
to provide an account of the connection between our formal concepts and what we can do 
in practice. 
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Footnotes 
1 Or, if the right kind of variation does not actually occur, there must be a fact of the 
matter about what would happen were it to do so.  
2 More precisely a causal law for an effect xj, L(xj), is a set of ordered pairs giving causes 
of xj and their weights L(xj) = 
{<a(1)j1,x1><a(2)j1,x1>…<a(k1)j1,x1><a(1)j2,x2>…<a(kn)jn,xn>}, a(k)jm ε R. We can then 
define xi causes xj with weight a just in case ∃L(xj) (<a,xi> ε L(xj)). (Notice that my 
formulations allows – as I have argued we should – for a cause to have multiple 
capacities with respect to the same effect. Once we have admitted this piece of 
information we can of course go on to define some concept of ‘the overall influence’ of a 
given cause on a given effect).  
Clearly the assumptions too need a more precise formulation. Transitivity, for example, 
becomes  
A'4: For any laws L(xj) and L(xi), and for any <b,xi> ε L(xj), L'(xj) is also a law, 
where  
L'(xj) = L(xj) – {<b,xi>}  {<b,a'(1)il, xi>, …, <b,a'(kl)in, xi>} for all <a',(km)im, 
xm> ε L(xi) 
The other assumptions are formulated similarly.  
We need some kind of complicated formulation like this to make clear, e.g., that arbitrary 
regroupings on the right-hand side of causal-law equation will not result in a causal law. 
For example, assume that x2 c= ax1 and x3 c= bx1+ cx2. It follows that x3=bx1+(c-
d)x2+dx2= bx1+(c-d)ax1+dx2= (b+ca-da)x1+dx2, but we do not wish to allow that x3 c= 
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(b+ca-da) x1+ dx2.For our purpose here, I think we can proceed with the more intuitive 
formulations in the text. 
3 In my own work (Cartwright 1999) on laws it is natural that they should vary since laws 
are epiphenomena, depending upon stable arrangements of capacities. I take the 
prevalence of “intervention” tests for causal correctness of the kind described here, based 
on the possibility of variations in causal laws, to indicate that a surprising number of 
other philosophers are committed to something like my view. 
4 Or, the possibility of the occurrence of these systems. (See footnote 1.).  
5 There are of course other kinds of arguments for linking manipulation and causation 
(e.g. Hausman 1998, Price 1991). My point here is that it is mistaken to argue that 
manipulation is central to causation on the grounds that one important kind of test for 
causal correctness – the “invariance” test – cannot do without it. 
6 I shall henceforth drop the use of “represented by” where it will not cause confusion and 
simply talk of variables causing other variables.  
7 This is similar to a standard kind of condition on parameter values in econometrics (cf. 
Engle, Hendry, and Richard 1983) and as a condition on parameter values plays a central 
role in Kevin Hoover’s (forthcoming) theory of causal inference. Woodward (1997) asks 
for statistical independence of the exogenous quantities. The proof here requires the 
additional assumption that there are no cross restraints on their values.  
8 Thanks to David Danks for highlighting this feature. 
9 The proof is similar to the proof of the theorems in Sec. 2 above. See Cartwright (1989). 
(Note that the argument in Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines (1993) against this result uses 
as a putative counterexample one that does not meet the conditions set.) 
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10 Recall that for x2 = c21x1 + Ψ2 to be a regression equation, <x1, Ψ2> = 0. I assume here 
that the u's have mean 0, variance 1 and <ui, uj> = 0, i ≠ j. 
11 As we know, randomized treatment/control experiments are designed to allow us to get 
around our lack of knowledge of the exogenous factors for missing factors. But the 
knowledge that we have succeeded in the aims of randomizing even when we have used 
our best methods is again hard to come by. 
12 As, of course is widely recognized in the experimental literature in the social sciences. 
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